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Preface

The initial goals of this essay were limited in scope and some
what narrowly defined*

Scant attention has been focused on the

problems of frontier defense during the American. Revolution, and
this was most particularly the case with the Southern frontier *
While several expeditions were mounted by the Revolutionary govern
ments against both their British and Indian adversaries during the
course of the war, seemingly the only one. spectacular enough to
capture the imagination of and provide serious inquiry by historian
was George Rogers Clark*s expedition-raid into the old Northwest
in 1778*

The combined North Carolina-Virginia expedition against

the Overhill Cherokee tribes in what is presently northeastern
Tennessee, led by the Virginian Colonel William Christian in the
autumn of 1776, had sunk into a state of historical limbo, earning
but a footnote or at most a sentence or two in most histories of
the period.

This seems to have occurred because although the expe

dition was quite successful, it was also singularly unspectacular.
Desiring to fill this void in historical studies, I undertook the
recreation and analysis of the events of the expedition itself and
the situation on the frontier in late 1775 and in 1776 which led
to it.
It was in the attempt to comprehend and assess the situation
on the North Carolina-Virginia frontier during this period that
the essay inexorably expanded far beyond my initial limited goals.

I found myself immersed in the chaotic, labyrinthine morass of
British-Indian and patriot-Indian relations and diplomacy.

The

picture was and is obscured by a welter of claims and counter
claims » charges and countercharges, semi-articulated and formulated
strategic and tactical plans, incomplete and misleading communica
tions , rumors, and the real and alleged machinations of land
speculators and British and colonial agents and traders,
Certain questions, previously only dimly perceived, took on
new stature and increased relevance.

What was the British strategy

in relation to both the Indians and the frontier Loyalists during
Sir Henry Clinton’s abortive expedition to the Southern colonies
in the winter and spring of 1775-1776?

Were there any long-term

British plans, explicit or implicit, for the use of a combined
Indian-Loyalist military force on the Southern frontier?

If so,

how did Colonel Christian’s expedition affect these plans, or
perhaps more to the point, the situation as it existed?

Was trie

situation essentially the same after his military operations as
before, or had it changed significantly in favor of one or the
other of the contending forces?
Certain other questions, apparent at the conception of the
study, retained and even increased their relevance.

What was the

response of the Virginia patriot government to the volatile situa
tion on the frontier?

How readily, in what manner, and to what

degree did it react when confronted by the danger?

What•part did

the frontiersmen play in providing for their own defense and to
what extent were they forced to rely upon their own resources?

To

what extent was the Virginia, government able to exploit the success

f.v

of the expedition in relation to control of the Indians and
Loyalists?
It i s , I believe, in the answers to these questions that the
true importance of Colonel Christian*s expedition lies.

This

paper is the end result of my attempt to provide those answers.
Although it would be impossible adequately to thank or even
to acknowledge all the people who have aided me in the undertaking,
I would like to take this opportunity to mention a few who come most
readily to mind.

Dr. Richard M. Brown has been extremely helpful

throughout the course of my research and writing, drawing upon his
long experience with, history and historical method to provide
cogent suggestions and criticisms at every level of development.
Perhaps as important, his patience in dealing with my problems
was seemingly infinite and deserves special thanks.
I would like to thank Dr. Edward M. Riley for the help ho gave
during the period of research and for reading and criticizing
the final product of that research.

Dr. Philip J. Funigello also

aided me in a number of w a y s , including reading the final draft
of this essay.

I take full responsibility for any errors in either

fact or judgment in the essay which have remained in spite of the
help of these men,
Finally, I would like to thank especially Arthur M. and Anna
M. Barnes, my parents, who have been a constant source of inspiration
and without; whose continued support, both moral and financial, this
project never could have been completed.
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ABSTRACT

In 1776, the situation on the Virginia-North Carolina frontier
was highly unstable and in constant turmoil as American patriots
and their British adversaries contested for the allegiance of power
ful Cherokee tribes which were located there. The outcome of this
contest was not predictable at the outset, as each side enjoyed
certain advantages and each labored under certain disabilities.
The British, though lacking in sufficient manpower to pose a mili
tary threat, had for a number of years worked to secure the friend
ship of the Indian tribes by supplying firearms, powder and shot,
and other materials.
They also, somewhat ineffectually, had attempt
ed to prohibit settlers from encroaching on Cherokee lands. The
patriot grotip, on the other hand, had a great deal of manpower which,
if organized, could demonstrate militarily to the Cherokee the advan
tages of an alliance with the patriots.
This paper deals with British maneuvers on and intentions for
the Virginia frontier in 1776 and in more depth with the reaction
of Virginia patriots both on the frontier and in Williamsburg. One
British goal, which seems implicit in their dealings in this area,
appears to have been the creation of some type of rudimentary state,
a refuge in which Loyalists and Indians could have been concentrated
to ease problems of defense and supply.
If such a plan had been
successfully implemented, the Loyalists would have been free from
coercion by the. patriots and their allegiance conserved until they
could have been used in conjunction with a British military expe
dition,
To this end British agents entered the Cherokee towns to
solidify support and prevent any indiscriminate attack on the fron
tier which would alienate Loyalists and cause them to support the
patriot government.
The British were unsuccessful in achieving the
latter objective, and their failure called forth a response which,
removed the larger goal from the realm of possibility.
The Virginia patriot forces reacted to the threat in a series
of swift, energetic responses. Those settlers who formed the lead
ing edge of settlement resisted the Indians to the utmost of their
limited resources, at the same time calling for assistance from
Williamsburg. The communications link between the frontier and
Williamsburg was Colonel William Preston. His energetic efforts
to transmit information and to facilitate the purchase of supplies
for the subsequent military expedition were in a sense the key to
patriot success.
The government in Williamsburg showed foresight and energy in
its reaction to the frontier situation. Aware that its claim of
sovereignty over the frontier depended on its ab ility to deal with
the Indians, the government launched a 2000 man force, commanded by
Colonel William Christian, against the Cherokee. The success of his
expedition left little doubt as to the locus of effective control
of the Virginia frontier by the end of 1776.
vili

THE VIRGINIA-NORTH CAROLINA FRONTIER IN 177

Chapter 1
British Strategy for Sir Henry Clinton’s 1776 Southern Campaign
and Its Relation to the Cherokee Indians on the Virginia Frontier

The military situation in the rebellious North American
colonies during the first year of the American Revolutionary
War w a s 5 from the British standpoint, decidedly unfavorable
for the prosecution of any major, sustained offensive operation.
Those detachments of British regulars which had been stationed
in the colonies at the outbreak of hostilities were often com
mitted to static defensive positions in garrisons on the frontier.
Nowhere was there a sufficiently large concentration of troops In
a position where the conditions were suitable for carrying on. an
offensive unsupported by significant portions of the local populace.
Rather than accept a military stalemate, British strategic
planners looked beyond the New England colonies, where the primary
confrontation of hostile forces had occurred, to find a theatre of
operations.where conditions were more favorable.

Based on evalua

tions of Loyalist sentiment and rebel strength offered by certain
royal governors in the Southern colonics, it was deemed probable
that a minimum demonstration of. British military and naval might
would result in the detachment of the "less hostile" South from
the patriot cause.

Josiah Martin, the royal governor of North

Carolina, was particularly enthusiastic in his reports to the
British ministry concerning the extent and pervasiveness of Loyalist
2

3feeling in his colony,^"
Although the situation in the Southern colonies altered at an
accelerating pace during the fall and winter of 1775, the British
ministry persisted in its plan to send a combined military-naval
expedition to the South.

While there were indications of rapidly

growing patriot strength, fostered by extra-legal judicial and
regulatory bodies, and a proportional disintegration of openly
Loyalist sentiment, this does not seem to have been adequately
recognized by the British ministry.
The plan, in its final form reported to General William Howe
by Lord Dartmouth in October, 1775, called for the rendezvous off
the Nortli Carolina coast of a naval force under Sir Peter Parker
sailing from Cork with a smaller expeditionary force from the
northern colonies under the command of a general officer (later
Sir Henry Clinton was so designated).

Parker's fleet was to carry

an extra 10,000 stand of arms and six light field pieces for the

2

use of Loyalist contingents raised by Governor Martin. “

Prolonged

delays in the sailing of Parker’s fleet from Cork, the discovery
shortly after the fleet did sail that the largest capital ships
had too deep a draft to permit passage of a bar at the mouth of
Cape. Fear River, and news from Governor Martin that the patriots
had effective control of the colony for over one hundred miles
inland eliminated all reasonable expectation of success of the
expedition in terms of its original goals before it was under way.

^Paul H. Smith, Lovalists and 'Redcoats (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1964)', 19.

2Ibid., 20.
3Ibid.t 24.

3

At. this point it would be wall to attempt to discern British
intentions concerning use of the Cherokee and other Indian tribes
in conjunction with this expedition.

Were the Cherokee attacks in

the summer and fall or 1776 which led to William Christian1s expe
dition. a part of the British strategic plan?
torical account of the expedition,

4

In a very early his-

the British military officer C.

Steaman explicitly stated that this was the British intention,

lie

wrote of the British attempts to detach the Southern colonies from
the more hostile North by fomenting some sort of civil war in the
South,

This was to be accomplished by the invasion of a combined

Indian-Loyalist military force on the frontier of the Carolines„
In his account the naval force under Sir Peter Parker and Sir
Henry Clinton was relegated to the status of a diversionary force,
intended primarily to distract patriot attention and divide their
forces.

5

He also spoke of a projected, secondary expedition of

British regulars which would enter the backcountry through East
Florida and coordinate its attack with that of the Indian-Loyalist
forces.^
"The early historians of Tennessee, John Haywood* and J. G. M.

g
Ramsey,

both accepted Stedman's contentions at face value.

4

C, Steaman, The History of the Origin, Progress, and. Termination
of the American War (Dublin, 1794), I, 278ff.
5Stedman, Ibid., 279.
6Stadman, T.bid,, 278.
^John Haywood, Tlpe Civil and Political History of the _State of
Tennessee from its Earliest Settlement to^ the Year 1796 (Knoxville,
Tenn«, 1823) , 4Iff .

g
J", G. >!. Ramsey, Trie Annals of Tennessee (Charleston, 1853),
142f f ,
~ ~
~

5
Certainly there are a number of indications of some consequence
which tend to demonstrate his validity.

Stedman had served in

the colonies throughout the Revolutionary War under such notable
military officers as Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, and
the Marquis Cornwallis, as he proudly indicated on the title
page.

His mention of a British expeditionary force invading the

colonies through East Florida corresponds with a letter allegedly
written by Henry Stuart, British Indian agent, to the settlers
■9
of Watauga in the spring of 1776.'

This apparently was sufficient

evidence for both Haywood and Ramsey, and given their obvious
predilection to place the ’’blame" for the attacks on the British,
it suited their purposes nicely.
Further investigation into the situation seems to cast con
siderable doubt, hox^ever, on Stedmanfs usefulness in assessing
the true goals and intentions of the British military officers
and ministerial officials who did the bulk of planning for the
Clinton expedition.
Regarding the proposed invasion through East Florida, it
seems that this was proposed very early in the war by a South
Carolina Loyalist, Thomas Brown, to relieve the frontier Loyalists
in the Carolinas and to supply them with arms, ammunition, and
various other necessities unobtainable on the frontier.

10

Whether

9

This letter is discussed, and its validity questioned in
Philip M« Hamer, "The Wataugans and the Cherokee Indians in 1776,"
East Tennessee Historical Society FublIc.at.lons, 111 (Jan. 1931),
108-126.
in
“''"'Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutlonary Frontier 1763-1783 (New
York, 1967), 89-90.

this plan was ever considered as a realistic alternative is ques
tionable.

Certainly it does not seem probable that the British

planners would have committed more of their limited force of
regulars* already stretched to the point of danger in the colonies,
to such an expedition without fairly conclusive proof of success
beforehand.

The man in the best position to know the situation

and evaluate it at this time was John Stuart, British superintendent
of Indian affairs for the Southern department, who had been in
11
St. Augustine since June 21, 1773.'

Yet, in those portions of

12

his correspondence which I have seen covering this period,

he

never mentioned this expedition, nor do any of his correspondents
question him concerning it.
The very logic of the entire campaign, which underwent frequent
and often radical alterations in its strategic concept, would
suggest that, the Cherokee attacks, when they did come, were not in
response to any systematic plan of operations.

The Clinton campaign

to the southern colonies in 1776 w a s , like British strategy generally
primarily an ad hoc response to a given set of particular conditions.
When these conditions changed, British responses had to be reformu
lated in order to meet the new situation.

As has been said, the

conditions in the Southern colonies had been so radically altered

13

Philip M, Hamer * "John Stuart’s Indian Policy During the
Early Months of the American Revolution," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XIII (Dec. 1930), 354.

12

These letters are printed in Hamer, "The Wataugans and
Cherokee," East Tenn. Publications, 111 (Dec. 1930), 108-126,
13

Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, ix.

by the time the expedition was in full readiness that the assump
tions upon which planning had hinged were no longer true.
The overall British capability to prosecute an offensive war
had increased dramatically by the summer of 1776.

By this time a

large army of regular troops had arrived in America and was prepar
ing to launch a major campaign in the middle colonies.

The Loyalist

in the colonies no longer were so necessary to British planning and
were consequently rapidly dismissed from consideration for the time
u exng«
*
14
b
It seems a safe assumption, then, that while the Indians may
have figured in the Initial British plans for the Southern campaign
of 1776, the situation, strategically and tactically, bad become
so altered that months before the initial Cherokee attacks, the
British no longer had intentions of employing them in such a manner.
This Is not to say, however, that the Cherokee nation, and the
frontier Loyalists were completely ignored or forgotten by all
British officials.

Many of the basic assumptions which had governed

*
British planning in 1776 were retained throughout the war.

Particu

larly it was expected that a. substantial degree of Loyalist sympathy
ifould continue to exist along the Southern frontier, ready to be.
tapped when conditions were once again favorable for a Southern
campaign.^

It was the task of John Stuart and his deputies to

secure and strengthen Britain's Indian allies and to provide for
the frontier Loyalists to the extent they were able.

The actions

Stuart took to fulfill this task and the manner in which the
frontier patriots reacted to them were what finally precipitated
the Cherokee attacks at a time and in a manner which were unfav
orable to British interests and not intended by Stuart himself.

Chapter 2
British Indian Agents in the Cherokee Nation
Designs and Actions

John Stuart, former British military officer and current
British superintendent of Indian affairs in the Southern colonies,
attempted from the verj^ beginning of the conflict between Great
Britain and her rebellious North American colonies to control the
Indians in his jurisdiction and to prevent their making any indis
criminate attacks on the Southern frontier.^*
pursuing such a policy are manifest,,

The reasons for

There was at this time a

considerable degree of Loyalist sentiment among the settlers in
the Southern backcountry•

Until some method could be devised for

identifying and differentiating between Loyalists and patriots, a
series of wholesale, uncontrolled attacks could only lose the
British whatever Loyalist support did exist by forcing all the
frontiersmen to look to the newly-created patriot governments for
protection*
On the other hand, Stuart would have to continue to provide
the Indian tribes with arms, ammunition, and the other supplies
which the British customarily had given them to retain their friend
ship.

Abdication of this responsibility would have created a

Philip M. Hamer, ’'John Stuart’s Indian Policy During the
Early Months of the American Revolution," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XVII (Dec. 1930), passim.

9

10
vacuum on the frontier which the patriots could exploit at will.
During the first nine months of 1775 the superintendent seems to
have been occupied with the problem of supplying Britain*s Indian
allies in order to retain their friendship.

His task was not made

easier by the fact that patriot groups in the Carolines, incensed
by rumors that he was attempting to agitate among the Indians and
precipitate an attack on the frontier, had driven him from Charleston
and forced him to relocate in St. Augustine in June.
The first orders he received concerning projected employment
of Indians for hostile purposes came from General Thomas Gage in
early October 1775.

Gages apparently incensed by the patriot use

of Indians against his position in Massachusetts, wrote:
You will now still have it in your-'power to hold a
correspondence with the Indians, which I beg you may
improve to the greatest advantage; and even when
opportunity opens to make them take arras against his
Majesty's enemies, and to distress them all in their
power, for no term is now to be kept with them. The
Rebells have themselves open’d the Door; they have
brought down all the Savages they could against us
here, who with their RifIg men. are continually firing
on our advanced sentries.
Stuart took advantage of the considerable degree of leeway
permitted' him in this order to maintain his position essentially
unchanged in relation to the Indian tribes and their use.

He

explicitly affirmed his intentions in a letter he sent to Alexander
Cameron, his deputy agent in residence with the Cherokee nation,
in Da cember 1775.

‘"As quoted in Philip M. Hamer, "The Wataugans and the Cherokee
Indians in 1776," East; Tennessee Historical Society Publications,
III (Jan. 1931), 108.

I am now to acquaint You that I have received Instructions
to employ the Indians in my Department to distress His
Majesty's Rebellious Subjects by all practicable Me ans,
that the Government and the Constitution may be reestab
lished in the distracted provinces.
Altho I do not construe this Instruction as an Order to
attack the frontier Inhabitants of the provinces indis
criminately:, by which Means the innocent might suffer
and the guilty escape, yet in Consequence of it my Duty
requires that no Time be lost in employing the Indians
of the Different Rations to give all the Assistance in
their Power to such of His Majesty's faithful Subjects
as may already have taken or shall hereafter take arms,
to resist the lawless Oppression of the Rebels and their
Attempts to overturn^the Constitution and oppose His
Majesty's Authority *
Even at this late date Stuart made no explicit statement to
his trusted deputy indicating that the British plans for the
campaign of 1776 included the use of Indian braves.

He did, how

ever , leave this alternative open by stressing the need for coord
ination of Indian and Loyalist efforts in the area.

He almost

certainly knew of the campaign itself and of the reliance upon
Loyalist forces on which it was based.

General Howe had received

news of the proposed campaign two months previously» and John
Stuart had specifically been designated to join the expeditionary
fleet when it reached Cape 'fear.

4

By the time, early in March

1776, when this meeting finally occurred, the situation had been
so altered that it seems improbable he was ordered to employ the
Indians in a hostile manner.
In the preceding months, however, he did what he could to insure
that in the eventuality that the Indians were needed they would be

3Hamer, Ibid., 109.
^Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats (Chapel Hill,-1964), 23.

adequately supplied.

He sent bis brother, Henry Stuart, first to

Pensacola and then to Mobile to organize and facilitate supply
operations.

He again counseled caution and moderation in dealing

with the Indians, lest the precarious balance on the frontier be
upset and along with it his plans for future use of Indians and
Loyalists.

As part of his final instructions to his brother Henry

Stuart wrote, "You will understand that an indiscriminate Attack
upon the Provinces is not m e ant, but to act in Execution of any
concerted Plan and to assist his Majesty *s Troops and Friends in
distressing the Rebells and bringing them to a sense of their Dufy
It seems reasonable to assume that Stuart at this point in
time envisioned the creation of a kind of Loyalist state, or more
properly a Brifcish-Loyalisfc sphere of influence, on the Southern
frontier, co-existing and cooperating closely with the. friendly
Indian tribes.

While this may appear at first to be a stronger

statement than the situation warrants, I believe that the logic of
the situation, the long-term British plans for military operations
in the South, and certain of Henry Stuart?s actions while he v/as
in the Cherokee. Nation all tend to indicate that something along
these lines was a conscious British goal.
As was stated above, the unsuccessful termination of Sir
Henry Clinton’s 1776 campaign in the Southern colonies did not
significantly alter one of the fundamental British assumptions
upon which the campaign strategy had been based initially.

The

"^Earner, "Wataugans and *Cherokees ," East Term. Publications ,
III (Dec. 1930), 110,

British ministry continued to believe throughout the war that there
existed a large reservoir of Loyalist sentiment in the Southern
colonies, particularly among the frontier settlers, which could be
tapped at will.

While the Loyalists became much less of an immediate

concern to British strategic planners in London during the second
half of 1776, some attempt must have been made by the British
officials in America to conserve Loyalist strength.,

This could be

accomplished most efficiently and economically if a base could be
provided which was relatively free from patriot harassment and well
supplied with British goods»

Paul Smith says, "The immediate

object of employing the Loyalists was not always to achieve a
military end.

At times they were organized for practically no other

reason than to afford them protection and to provide for their
useful employment.

. .

At least once during the war British

desire to provide a Loyalist "haven" resulted in the formulation
of a comprehensive plan centered on a section of the Maine coast

J

Perhaps more pertinent for this discussion, the creation of
a Loyalist haven of some type appears to have been an objective of
C l i n t o n s campaign, especially after it became apparent that the
original goals were unobtainable at this time.

Paul Smith indicates

that this desire was one of the prime motivating forces behind the
British attack on Charleston.

"For some time Clinton had given

considerable thought to seizing a position that might be held with

Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, ix.
7
For a discussion of this plan and its outcome see Smith,
Ibid., 175-177.

14'
a small force, where loyal refugees and fleeing royal officials
might find asylum until the proper season for a southern campaign
returned.”

8

Since Stuart did confer with Clinton off Cape Fear in

March 1776, he must have been made aware of Clinton’s intentions
and of the need for providing for those colonists loyal to the
British cause.

The situation in abstract, then, seems amenable

to the hypothesis that John Stuart envisioned the creation of a
Loyalist haven on the Southern frontier where it would be in close
proximity with known areas of Loyalist sympathy.

Henry Stuart's

actions in the Cherokee Nation in the spring of 1776 afford some
concrete indications that this indeed was the case .
Henry Stuart had been sent by his brother to Pensacola and
Mobile late in 1775 to facilitate arrangements for supplying the
friendly Indian tribes in order to retain their friendship.

Early

in March 1776, upon his arrival in Mobile, he was met by the
Cherokee chieftain Dragging Canoe (Cherokee name Chiucanacina)
who wanted to know why the customary supplies of arms, ammunition,
and goods were no longer being sent to his people.

9

Dragging Canoe

further complained that certain frontiersmen from Virginia and North
Carolina had crossed the treaty line of 1770 into Indian territory
and were building homes and clearing land for farming.

He stated

8Smith, Ibid., 28.
9
Much of the following narrative comes from Hamer, Wataugans
and Cherokee,” E, Tenn. Publications , III (Jan. .1931), 101-126.
Hamer, writing in the imperial school vein throughout this at t i d e ,
has made extensive use of reports of British Indian agents which
are found in the British Public Records Office.

that it was his intention and that of many of the younger Cherokee
braves to attack these trespassers and drive them off the frontier.
Stuarts realizing that such an indiscriminate, uncontrolled
attack cohid only be detrimental to British hopes for the area,
determined to leave for the Cherokee t017ns immediately, taking
thirty horse-loads of ammunition with him.

Arriving in the Cherokee

towns late in April, Stuart and his companion Alexander Cameron
received such a favorable reception that in their report to John
Stuart they expressed the conviction that the Cherokee would fight
for the British when called upon to do so.

Two other highly sig

nificant comments were contained in this report.

The first was

the report that "an oath of loyalty was administered to all white
men in the nation."

10

The second, highly indicative of British

intentions, was a request for enough arms and ammunition to supply
not only the Cherokee, but also the frontier loyalists,.with whom
it was expected the Indians would cooperate.XX
The only ominous sign mentioned was the extreme belligerency
of the younger Cherokee braves towards those frontiersmen who had
settled in the Watauga and Nollichucky regions in violation of the
treaty of 1770.

It was of the utmost importance that Stuart be

successful in persuading these settlers to withdraw voluntarily
back across the treaty line, for if this were accomplished it would
perform a double service to the British cause.

First, it would

avoid the possibility of an immediate Indian attack on the frontier,

10

Hamer, Ibid., 111.

1XHamer, Ibid., 111.

something the British were in constant fear would occur before
Loyalists had been separated from patriots and a degree of control
and supervision over Indian actions was achieved.

Secondly, it

would clearly delineate the area of British influence and would
further have received de facto recognition from the frontier
patriots by the very act of their withdrawal.
Stuart was able to persuade the Cherokee chiefs to allow him
to effect a voluntary withdrawal by the trespassing frontiersmen.
The Indian leaders consented to wait twenty days 9 within which
period Stuart could negotiate the removal of the settlers.

His

first letter to them, written on May 7 and carried to the settle
ments by the trader Isaac Thomas, seems to have been drafted in
a moderate tone, warning them of their danger and stressing that
the British were responsible for preventing a surprise attack.

12

Several letters were exchanged between Stuart and the Wataugans»
the latter apparently trying to prolong the period of grace until
they could apply to the Virginians for aid against the anticipated

attack.
The letter In this series which received widespread publica
tion in the colonies and seems to have galvanised the Virginia
patriots into action was possibly a forgery, fabricated by the
Wataugans to insure Virginia’s support against the Indians.

^

The

latter read as follows:
Gentlemen"— Some time ago Mr. Cameron and myself wrote
you a letter by Mr. Thomas, and enclosed a talk we had
with the Indians respecting the purchase which is report©
you lately made of them on the River Watauga [sic],

^ H a m e r , Ibid., 116.

17
Nollichuckey, S. C. We are since informed that yon are
under great apprehensions of the Indians doing mischief
immediately. But it is not the desire of his Majesty
to set his friends and allies, the Indians, on his liege
subjects:
Therefore, whoever you are that are willing
to join his Majesty’s forces as soon as they arrive at
the Cherokee Nation, by repairing to the KingTs standard,
shall find protection for themselves and their families,
and be free from all danger whatever; yet, that his
Majesty’s officers may be certain which of you are willing
to take up arms in his Majesty’s just right, I have thought
fit to recommend it to you and everyone that is desirous
of preventing inevitable ruin to themselves and families,
immediately to subscribe a written paper acknowledging
their allegiance to his Majesty, King George, and that
they are ready and willing, whenever they are called on,
to appear in arms in defense of the British right in
America; which paper, as soon as it is signed and sent
to me, by safe h a n d , should any of the inhabitants be
desirous of knowing how they are to be free from every
kind of insult and danger, inform them, that his Majesty
will immediately land an army in West Florida, march
them through the Creek to the Chickasaw Nation, where
five hundred warriors from each nation are to join them,
and then come by Chota, who have promised their assistance,
and then to take possession of the frontiers of North
Carolina and Virginia, at the same time that his Majesty’s
forces make a division on the sea coast of those Provinces„
If any of the inhabitants have any b e e f , cattle, flour,
pork or horses to spare, they shall have a good price
for them by applying to do, as soon as his Majesty’s
troops are embodied.
I am yours, etc.,
^
Henry Stuart
There is some evidence that this letter was indeed fabricated
by the Wataugans, although not so conclusive that Hamer, an obvious
Anglophilej would state this without reservation.

Henry Stuart

himself later stated the letter was a forgery in statements to his
brother and in a letter to his former friend Edward Wilkinson.
Wilkinson, who had known Stuart on the Carolina frontier and had
since openly expressed his sympathy for the patriot cause, wrote

13
'As quoted in J, G. M. Ramsey, The Annals of Tennessee
(Charleston, 1853), 147-148.

him protesting the "incendiary’' nature of the letter and claiming
it would surely precipitate a border war between Indian and white.
In his reply dated June 28, 1776, Stuart claimed, "The people of
Watauga have made me the author of the most horrid falsehood, but
I can assure you of one serious truth, that the Cherokees are not
alone in the resolution to free themselves from the unjust encroach
inents of their neighbors*

I have been informed that copies of

the forged letter have been industriously circulated.

As such

practices are a scandal to any cause I trust you will take some
pains in undeceiving the people."

14

He also reported to his

brother John that Isaac Thomas, the liaison between him and the
Wataugans, signed a deposition when he returned to the Cherokee
towns stating that a Jessy Benton had forged the letter in question
so expertly that no one could distinguish his handwriting from
that of S t u a r t . ^
However, if the letter was in fact a forgery it was at: the
same time representative of the goals for which Stuart was striving
There are numerous inferences to the creation of a Loyalist refuge
on the frontier.

His intention clearly was to attract as many

Loyalists and essentially neutral frontiersmen into declaring
their sympathy for the British cause and to force the unrepentant
patriots from the frontier by the threat of attack.

The reference

to the British expedition from Florida evidently was

14

As quoted in Walter H, Mohr, Federal-Indian Relations 17741788 (Philadelphia, 1933), 53n*
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Hamer, "Wataugans and Cherokees," E. Term., Publications,
III (Jan. 1931), 121.

used as an effective device to arouse fears, if by Stuart for its
coercive value, if by Benton to maximize the potential dangeir
facing the frontiersmen in the eyes of the Virginians*
Hamer in concluding his article says that the real point of
controversy throughout was the question of illegal seizure of
Indian land by Virginia, and North Carolina frontiersmen and that
the British agents did all in their power to prevent the outbreak
of armed hostilities,.

That war was not avoided was due to the

success of the Wataugans in identifying their own interests with
those or the patriot cause.

16

Hamer implies that this was not the

case, but he has misread the situation on the frontier.

In a

larger sense the interests of the Wataugans most: certainly did
coincide with those of the American patriots.

If British influence

was allowed to become paramount in the area, unchallenged by the
patriots, it could only serve to weaken the position of the revolu
tionary governments in Virginia and North Carolina.

They could not

abdicate their responsibility for protection of the frontier and
expect to retain any claim they had of exercising legitimate govern
mental powers.
In any case, the British agents rapidly lost what control of
the situation they had previously been able to maintain.

The arrival

in the Cherokee nation of delegations from the Ottawa, Shawnee, arid
other Northern tribes urging war and the subsequent arrival of a
British trader named Colbert with one hundred horseloads of annumition

made war practically inevitable.^

The explicitly stated British

goal of preventing indiscriminate Indian attacks on the frontier
was lost irrevocably.

The implied goal of creation of a Loyalist

refuge on the frontier hung on the success or failure of those
attacks.

If the Virginia and North Carolina patriots were able

to respond adequately to the challenge presented , this goal
would also be removed as a possible alternative.

As will be shown

in the following chapters, the patriots were more than able to
meet that challenge.
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John P. Brown, Old Frontiers:
(Kingsport, 1938), 146,

The Story of the Cherokee

Chapter 3
Spring and Summer 1776
Colonial Reaction to the Indian Threat on the Frontier

The remainder of this essay consists of a description and
analysis of the reaction by Virginia patriot-frontiersmen and the
revolutionary government to the Indian attacks which began during
the summer of 1776.

Hereafter when I speak of the "frontier’8 it

will represent more than just the settlements in the Watauga and
Nollichucky watersheds, which were the extreme leading edge of
colonial migration.

The eastern portions of Fincastle and Botetourt

counties were in a transitional period at this time, rapidly filling
with settlers and developing systematic administrative and judicial
institutions responsible to the government in Williamsburg.

This in

itself differentiates the region from the Watauga settlement, which
provided its own governmental institutions and was legally responsible
to no colonial government.

At the same time the Flncastle-Botetourfc

region was more unsettled, more in a state of constant flux, than
the. older, better organized settlements in eastern Virginia.
This "middle" position occupied by eastern Fincastle and Botetourt
counties was important for the purposes of this study because their
leaders were instrumental in bringing the plight of the frontiersmen
to the attention of the revolutionary government•

Their own response

fco the dangers of the situation was rapid, efficient, and resourceful.
They were able to mobilize the men and supplies available in the
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immediate vicinity in a remarkably short period of time, using them
to reinforce the frontier until the more distant colonial government
in Williamsburg could bring its own resources to bear in the conflict.
Colonel William Preston, freeholder in Fincastle County and chairman
of the Fincastle County Committee of Safety, provided the vital
link in the communications network which stretched from the endan
gered frontier back to Williamsburg.

At a time when communications

systems were decidedly primitive by present-day standards, Preston
performed admirably, transmitting vital information, which he received
daily in the form of letters, both east and west.
1
Born in Newton, Ireland, November 25, 1729, Colonel William
O
Preston had emigrated with his parents, John and Elizabeth Patton
Preston, to the colony of Virginia in 1740.

2

Educated by the

Reverend John Craig, Preston was initially employed in posting the
account books of Staunton merchants and in aiding his uncle, James
Patton, in managing his large business enterprise.

As a young man

Preston served as deputy to Wallace Estill, High Sheriff of Augusta
County, as well as clerk of the vestry and clerk of the county
Court-Martial.

3

He rose to colony-wide prominence during the French

and Indian War, in which he attained the rank of captain, commanding
a company of rangers.

In 1761 he married Susanna Smith of Hanover

County and when, in the same year, the town of Staunton was incorporated,

^Joseph A. Waddell, Annals of Augusta County, Virginia, From
1726 to 1871, 2nd ed. (Staunton, Virginia, 1902), 57.

2Ibid., 120.

he was appointed to serve on its board of t r u s t e e s P r e s t o n ' s
stature in the county continued its steady rise and he was elected
to represent Augusta in the Virginia House of Burgesses for the
1766 and 1768-1769 sessions
Preston moved to Botetourt County when, it was created from
a portion of Augusta County in 1769 and immediately accepted
positions of importance and power in the county administration.
At the first meeting of the county court on February 14, 1770, he
was commissioned a county justice,, serving there with William
Flaming and other prominent frontiersmen.^

At the same time he

was qualified by the court to act as a county surveyor, an escheater,
a coroner, and a colonel of the militia.

In 1773 he. moved his resi

dence once again, on this occasion to an estate he purchased and
named Smithfield, in the newly created county of Fincastle.

He

'

served in a number of capacities during the Revolutionary War in
behalf of Fincastle County, and died at Sraithfield on June 29, 1783
after having been taken ill the previous day at a regimental muster.

7

The first information which Colonel Preston received regarding
the situation on the frontier was in the form of a deposition signed
by Gabriel Shoat before John Montgomery and Janies McGavode on May 13,
1776.

8

Shoat informed the Fincastle County leaders that an Indian

4Xb±d., 121.
Cu m

5Ibid., 121.
^ b i d 0, 215.
7Ibid»g 121.
g
Deposition of Gabriel Shoat, May 13, 1776, The Preston and
Virginia Papers of the Draper Collection of Manuscripts, microfilm,
400, 3 8 j, Colonial Williamsburg Research Center, Williamsburg, Virginia

trader, Isaac Thomas, had arrived in the ’’neighborhood" on the
eleventh of May carrying letters from the Cherokee Indians to the
Watauga settlers.

The letters demanded that the Wataugans abandon

their homes and retreat back into Virginia territory or suffer
the consequences of an immediate attack.

Thomas also seems to

have said, through Shoat, that the British agents Alexander Cameron
Henry Stuart, and Captain Nathan Gist, a former Virginia militia
officer, were agitating the Indians and supplying them with arms
and ammunition.

Thomas feared that the war had already begun,

since at least one man had been killed and scalped in the Powell’s
Valley settlement.
The next day Preston received a letter from Major Anthony
Bledsoe., who was at that time in the Watauga settlement itself,
which substantiated much of what Shoat had sworn in the deposition,
Bledsoe further indicated that the Cherokee letters had severely
alarmed the Wataugan settlers and that something would have to
done to quiet their fears.

be

He requested that Preston make avail

able an additional quantity of powder (unspecified amount) over
and above the fifty weight which had already been allotted.
On May 16 Preston received another letter from the frontier,
again indicating that the Watauga settlers were in a precarious
position and that help was needed immediately.^

The letter con

tained a request for an immediate shipment of powder, which would
help to steady the nerves of a great many of the settlers who were

Q
Anthony Bledsoe to William Preston, May 14, 1786, Draper Mss.
4QQ, 39.
^ G i l b e r t Christian to William Preston, May 16, 1776, Draper
Mss., 4QQ, 40.
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on the verge of flight.

Two further bits of information included

in the letter indicate the resourcefulness of the frontiersmen in
acting quickly to provide for their own defense.

The first was

the mention that a Captain William Brisco was already raising men
for a militia unit, though no hint was given as to the number of
men he was able to recruit.

The second was the fact that the

settlers had raised money for the powder they had requested, and
the bearer of the letter, James King, was prepared to pay cash on
the spot and carry the powder back with him to the Watauga
settlements.
On May 22 Preston received the first "proof" of the frontier
situation when Major Bledsoe wrote him a second time, now including
copies of the Cherokee letters (the originals were reportedly sent

11

to the North Carolina Convention).

Bledsoe again indicated that

the frontiersmen were very uneasy and suggested that two hundred
pounds of powder be immediately shipped to the frontier and sold
to the settlers.

He also requested that Preston arrange for a

meeting of the Fincastle County Committee of Safety to formulate
and organize adequate defensive measures which could be implemented
at once.
Preston also received a copy of a letter from a Captain William
Cooke, to Major Bledsoe, possibly Bledsoe having included it with
his own letter of the twenty-second although Preston noted on the
12
back that it had come the twenty-seventh.

Cooke apparently was

11

Bledsoe to Preston, Captain ShelbyTs home, May 22', 1776,
Draper Mss., 4QQ, 40.
32
Captain William Cooke to Major Anthony Bledsoe, Amos Eaton's,
May 27, 1776, Draper Mss., 4QQ, 44.

desirous of indicating widespread patriot sentiment on the frontier
as he referred several times to the "glorious cause" of Americans
in fighting for "independence of liberty and property."

He also

saw quite clearly one of the dangers inherent in the frontier
situation when he mentioned that it would be unfortunate to have
to fight the war on two fronts, one on the coastal regions against
the British regulars and the other on the frontier against Britain'
Indian allies.

Even if this were the case, however, he reminded

Preston of the duty of all patriotic men to aid the Wataugans, who,
he said, had in the past rendered many vital services in behalf
of the Virginians.
On May 30 Preston received another letter from the Watauga
settlement, this time written by one of the leaders, John Carter,

13

Carter, who at this time was corresponding with the British agents
in the Cherokee nation in an effort to gain time for the Wataugans
to construct a proper defensive system, provided many details on
the day to day events occurring on the frontier.

Carter receivexd

much of this information'from two Indian traders, John Bryan and
Isaac Thomas, who had returned from another mission to the Cherokee
towns just the previous day.

It was obviously Carter's intention

to demonstrate to Preston the fact that the British agents were
the prime motivating factors in bringing about the Indian attacks.
He spoke of the intimidation of frontiersmen with patriotic leaning
by Cameron and a body of Tories, thereby hoping to identify clearly
the conjunction of Wataugan interests with those of patriotic

"'John Carter to William Preston, Watauga, May 30, 1776,
Draper Mss,, 4QQ, 45.

Virginians and impress this fact on Preston’s mind.

According to

Carter the British were vigorously prosecuting a policy of extract
ing oaths of allegiance to the king from white settlers on the
frontiers, coercing those who appeared to have patriotic sympathies.
A further indication of true British intentions was the fact that
Captain Gist had told Isaac Thomas that if the Wataugans were really
desirous of retaining their royal allegiance (as apparently they
had claimed in certain of the conciliatory letters written in order
to gain time) they had nothing to fear, but should move with all
their belongings into the Cherokee nation, and live in peace with
the Indians.
Preston mast have been alarmed by the news contained in Carter’s
letter, as the threat to the patriot cause should the British succeed
in executing their plans was quite apparent•

By the end of May 1776,

Preston had already received, numerous statements as to the danger
on the frontier and several indications that the. Wataugann were
determined to provide for their own defense to the limit of their
resources.

There is no question, however, that they could fight

little more than a delaying action, hoping to gain enough time so
that the Virginians could organize themselves and come to their
rescue.
An indication of the degree of alarm with which the frontiersmen occupying the “middle'1 position viewed the situation was con
tained in a letter from the North Carolinian Matthew Brodes to
Major Bledsoe.

14

14

Brodes mentioned the possibility of an Indian

“'"Matthew Brodes to Major Anthony Bledsoe, May 30, 1776,
Draper Mss., 4QQ, 46,

hts
attack and, somewhat incredibly, offered to raise two thousand
men immediately to aid the Wataugans.

This offer has been termed

incredible because of the logistical and supply problems which
would have been faced by such a body of men.

This is about equal

to the number which Christian eventually led against the Cherokee
five months later after a great deal of preparations had been
made.

Still, the degree of alarm on the frontier nrast have been

enormous if, only three weeks after the first indications of British
moves were received, Brodes could have contemplated raising such
a large force.

It is unfortunate that no further mention is made

of Brodes1 proposal and consequently it has been impossible to
determine how the offer was received and if any subsequent action
was taken on it.
Beginning in June Preston began to receive the first indica
tion that letters he had written to Williamsburg had been received
favorably and that action was being taken.

Early in June he received

a letter from the Williamsburg Committee of Safety concerning action
taken on his request for powder.

15

He was informed that upon con

sideration of his letter (no date given) which contained the affi
davits of Gabriel Shoat and John Ramsey, the committee had deemed
the situation sufficient^ alarming to grant his request for
additional supplies of powder.

Accordingly, two hundred pounds

of powder over and above that amount already allotted were to be
shipped to Fincastle and Botetourt counties, where the county

^JJ, Beckley to William Preston, Williamsburg, May 27, 1776,
Dr ap er Mss., 401
Q , 48,

lieutenants would see to its proper dispersal.

Apparently Preston

had forwarded the frontiersmen’s request for powder almost as soon
as Vie had received their letters, and his recommendation carried
sufficient weight in Williamsburg to receive prompt action there.
A letter he received on June 8, 1776 is interesting because
it indicates that the mention of a British expedition from East
Florida to the Cherokee nation was not considered very likely or
practical.

16

William Fleming, who wrote the letter in response to

one received from Preston, said that he was in agreement with
Preston that the route allegedly laid out by Stuart could not be
traversed easily.

Fleming added that he could not believe the

Cherokee really wished a rupture with the colonies, but that since
the American army before Quebec had been dispersed, he looked for
a. good deal of ’’mischief” on the frontier.

In order to avoid the

possibility that the situation would get completely out of hand,
Fleming requested that additional supplies, particularly of powder,
be sent to the frontiersmeru
Colonel William Fleming, who occupied the same position and
performed similar services for Botetourt county as Preston did
for Fincastle County at this time, was a well respected frontiersman
gentleman with a background similar in some regards to that of
Preston.

He was born in Jedburgh, Scotland on February 18, 1729

to Leonard and Dorothea Fleming and was closely allied to several
Scottish noble families.

18
17

17

He was educated at the University of

William Fleming to Preston, June 8, 1776, Draper Mss., 4QQ, 4

Hugh Blair Grigsby, The History of_ the Virginia Federal
Convention of 1788, II (Richmond, 1891), 40.

Edinburgh, graduated as a medical, surgeon, and shortly thereafter
enlisted in the British navy as a surgeon*s m a t e „

After brief

service in the navy, including a period of imprisonment in Spain
after his ship was captured, Fleming resolved to resign his
commission and emigrate to the American colonies, landing in
Norfolk in August, 1755,

He immediately enlisted in the Virginia

Regiment to serve against the French and their Indian allies and
was commissioned an ensign on August 25, 1755.

18

For the next eight

years he served continuously on the frontier, taking part in several
campaigns and eventually attaining the rank of captain (May 22,
1762).19
In 1763 Fleming resigned his military commission and began a
career as a surgeon on the Virginia frontier, settling in Staunton,
Augusta county.

In the same year he married Anne Christian,

daughter of Israel Christian, a prosperous merchant with large
western landholdings, and sister of William Christian, prominent
frontiersman and commander of the 1776 Cherokee expedition.

After

several prosperous years in Augusta county, during which time he
served as vestryman (November 1764) and county justice (May 1765),
he moved in 1768 to an estate, Bellmont, which he received from
his father-in-law, In what shortly would become Botetourt county.
At the first session of the county court of Botetourt he was com
missioned , along with William Preston, as one of the first county

20

justices (February 14, 1770).

21

In March 1714 Fleming was commis

sioned a lieutenant-colonel of the Botetourt County militia.

He

participated in the Battle of Point Pleasant in Dunmore’s War,
during the course of the battle receiving three wounds which made
him a semi-invalid for the remainder of his life.

22

In spite of his disabilities, however, he was commissioned
comity lieutenant of Botetourt by the committee of safety on
April 1, 1776, in which capacity he acted energetically to create
a defensive system for the Virginia frontier.

23

From May 1777

through October 1779 he served as representative of Botetourt,
Washington, Montgomery, and Kentucky in the Virginia Senate; in
1780 he became a member" of the Council and for the brief period
June 1-12, 1781 he was the acting chief executive of Virginia.

24

After his long, meritorious career of military and civil service
to Virginia as both colony and state, he died on August 5, 1795
25
at his family estate, Bellmont.
It is apparent from the tenor of Fleming’s letter, as well
ao the one from William Christian which arrived the same day,
that these man all believed that the possibilities for avoiding war
were still good so long as rapid measures were taken to demonstrate

2^Williara D. Hoyt, Colonel William Fleming on the Virginia
Frontier, 1755-1783 (unpubl. Ph. D. diss, Johns Hopkins University,
1940), 53.
22lbid., 83.
^ S e e Armistead Churchill Gordon in DAB J.V. "Fleming, William.
2^Ibid.
25

'Grigsby, History Virginia Convention, 52e

the determination of the patriots to defend their advanced settle
ments.

Christian’s letter, a rather lengthy one, included a dis

cussion of all of the activities on the frontier in the previous
month.

He indicated agreement with Preston’s actions in advising

the Wataugans to abandon their settlements and relocate on the
Virginia side of the boundary between that state and the Indian
nation.

This is the only mention I have found on this subject

and apparently it was not indicative of a reluctance to aid the
Wataugans on the part of Preston and others as the Virginians
certainly did not refuse to support the settlers on the Watauga
when they did not heed this advice.
Christian himself did not believe that the Watauga settle-3
merits were the real cause of the Indians’ actions.

He said he was

sure this was merely the excuse used by the British agents in
fomenting trouble for the patriots everywhere and he added that
he was "very glad to find that the ministerial gentry has been so
rapid in disclosing without further disguise tbair aim,

« . ,”
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Christian also commented on several of Preston’s actions in pre
paring a defense for the frontier, the first mention I have seen
indicating that Preston had not been content \?il:h merely transmit
ting correspondence to other concerned parties„

In an indication

that some trouble in raising an adequate number of militia men
might be expected,

Christian said he would advise Preston ”to order

a third or a half [of all available militia] instead of a fourth
of your militia to be in readiness, if you order a third perhaps

’
^ William Christian to Preston, Smifchfield, June 8, 1776,
Draper Mss », 4QQ, 49»

more than a fourth can be had, if all appear you will not have
too many.

..27

Further on in his letter Christian stated that he wished
enough time remained so that messengers could be sent from the
Virginia Convention to the Cherokee villages, declaring the
peaceful intentions of the frontiersmen and warning the Indians
they were planning their own destruction if they proceeded with
their proposed attack.

He seems to have thought at this time

it might just be possible to avert the attack if a sufficient
demonstration of colonial military strength were made near the
Cherokee frontier.

He continued, however, that he doubted if

the Convention could be convinced this was necessary until further
proof of the Indians’ hostile intentions was received from the
frontier.

In spite of this, Christian assured Preston he would

do all in his power to get the Convention to take immediate steps
to provide for frontier defense and asked him to communicate this
to the Wataugans.
In concluding his letter Christian spoke of what he considered
the real danger in the frontier situation*

He said that it was

possible that the "people of Watauga may be frightened into a
confederacy opposing the patriot cause unless steps were taken to
28
secure their l o y a l t y H e r e

Christian has essentially stated what

I consider to be the intentions of the British agents at this time—
the creation of a Loyalist refuge in the Indian territory.

27
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Christian to Preston,' Ibid.
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Christlar
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stated he would do all he could to counteract this tendency and
urged Preston to make the frontiersmen fully aware that such a
course of action could result only in their own destruction.
A week after having received this advice from Colonel Christian,
Preston wrote a letter to Edmund Pendleton in Williamsburg, giving
a report of the situation as it then stood, the measures which
had already been taken by the frontiersmen for their own defense,
and an assessment of^ the expected needs of the frontiersmen in
29
terms of supplies and troops/

Preston reported that, in response

to a resolution by the "Honorable Convention," a committee meeting
had been

held in Fincastle County and that

men each had been formed. One company x^as

two companies of fifty
stationed on the

frontier, on the Great Island in the Holston River.

The other

was divided, with thirty men being sent to a place called Rye Cave
on the Clinch River and the remainder being sent to Fort Chiswell
to guard the ammunition.

He immediately added that this number

of men was insufficient to provide for a proper defense when the
Cherokee, did finally attack in numbers.
Preston went on to say that the Wataugans had taken certain
measures

for their own defense as well, raising one hundred

who were

stationed between the settlements

men

and the Indians. They

had also purchased one hundred pounds of powder and two hundred
pounds of lead, which Preston had sent them immediately.

Apparently

the patriots were quick to deal with suspected Loyalists among
the frontier settlers, using much the same methods as had Cameron

29

William Preston to Edmund Pendleton, Fincastle, June 15,
1776, Draper Mss., 4Q Q , 50.
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previously.

Preston mentioned that Captain John Shelby from Holston

and a Captain Robinson from Watauga had rounded up approximately
seventy suspected Loyalists and required them to swear an oath of
allegiance to the patriot cause.

He added that a number of German

settlers were thought to be disloyal and indicated he wanted instruc
tions as to how to deal with them "in case their obstinacy causes
them to go to dangerous lengths."

30

At this point it was apparently still felt that war might
possibly be avoided 0

Preston said that Isaac Thomas had once

again returned to the Watauga settlements , saying that he believed
the Indians would agree to "reasonable" terms if letters were
sent immediately professing the friendship of the colonists for
them.

The committee of safety did this at once, as Thomas declared

he could not wait until such letters could be forwarded from
Williamsburg.

The only recent information he had received from

the frontier spoke of a great deal of Indian activity in Powell's
valley and a report that a Tory, one Mr. Robinson, was leading a
band of forty white men in the area, trying to recruit men for
the British and Indian side.

Immediate measures had been taken in

an attempt to verify this last bit of information, but no answer
had been received at the time the letter was written.
The final communication Preston received in the: month of June
came from the Williamsburg Committee of Safety, detailing certain
measures to be taken for defense of the frontier.

30
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Six more

Preston to Pendletoni Idem.

Edmund Pendleton to William Preston, Williamsburg, June 20,
1776, Draper Mss., 4Q Q , 51.

companies of militia were to be raised, four from Fincastle County
and one. each from Augusta and Botetourt counties.

In the event

that actual hostilities were to break out, the county lieutenants
of each were empowered to request reserves from other .counties
less hard pressed.

The committee also had approved of the action

of sending an envoy to the Cherokee nation [presumably this refers
to Isaac Thomas], in an attempt to prevent or at least delay the
invasion.
Thus far then, by late June, a great deal of preparation had
already been made for the defense of the frontier, largely by the
frontiersmen themselves, and the government in Williamsburg had
been informed of the situation.

The fact that no real hostilities

had as yet broken out seems to indicate that neither side in the
conflict wanted a war if its ends could be realized by peaceful
means.

It was a time of negotiation and preparation, as each side

tried to secure its power in its respective region before taking
any offensive measures.
During the month of July the move towards actual hostilities
escalated slowly, with the first reports coming in of actual
Indian depredations on the frontier, as yet, however, only among
the more isolated settlers.

The large bulk of the frontier inhabi

tants in the Watauga region had taken refuge in stockades and block
houses, abandoning crops and livestock, and the. Indians seem to
have been content until late in the month to attack stragglers and
steal livestock.

Most of the information which Preston received

in July came from the almost daily letters he got from Captain
William Russell.

Captain Russell was well qualified to assess the relative
dangers and military necessities of the current situation on the
frontier, having served for a number of years previously as an
officer in the colonial militia during border conflicts.

Born in

Orange County, Virginia, 1735, the son of Lieutenant Colonel William
and Mary Henley Russell, and educated at the College of William
and Mary, he began his military career in the French and Indian
War, attaining the rank of captain in command of a company of
rangers.

32

He was an active participant in the Battle of Point

Pleasant (October 10, 1774) and commanded the garrison of the fort
at Kanawha until he was relieved by Governor Duniaore in July,
1775.

33

During this same year Russell was elected a member of the

Fincastle County Committee of Safety, and the following year (1776)
he was elected to represent Fincastle County in the House of
Burgesses.
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Russell served throughout the Revolutionary War as

a colonel (commissioned Dec. 19, 1776) in the continental army,
eventually being brevetted Brigadier General on November 3, 1783.
Following the end of hostilities he represented Washington County
in the state assembly and senate for several terms until he was
taken ill and died at Fort Royal, Virginia in 1793.
On the seventh Russell wrote to Preston concerning problems

Elizabeth Y. Russell, "Brigadier General William Russell
of Virginia," Virginia Magazine of Hisjtory and Biography, LXI
(1944), 268.
~
'
33Ibid., 266.
3/4Ibid. , 268.
35Ibid., 268.

36Ibid., 268.
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he was having with the militia troops under his command.
Apparently many of these troops had been drawn from north and
central Virginia, as Russell says they were worried about the
possibility of a Shawnee attack upon their homes while they were
away.

He requested that Preston attempt to raise new companies

of militia to replace these men as quickly as possible.

He also

informed Preston that Thomas Madison had been appointed commissary
"in convention" and would act in this capacity until an executive
decision could be. reached to make the appointment official.
On the seventeenth Russell wrote again, with the information
that Isaac Thomas had signed an oath indicating that a "large
body" of warriors were on the march towards the white settlements
from the Overhill Cherokee tribes.

38

He urgently requested that

Preston, in his capacity as county lieutenant of Fincastle, send
150 armed men to repel the invasion.
On the twentieth Russell went Into more detail in describing
actions he had taken to meet the attack which he felt was imminent.

39

The frontiersmen *s strength in the area he calculated at not more
than 240 men, a decidedly insufficient force to cope with the Indian
warriors 0

He also examined the situation at the lead mines and

felt that the garrison stationed there needed reinforcement, which
he promptly did with thirty men, also ordering them to build a

^ W i l l i a m Russell to William Preston, July 7, 1776, Draper
Mss,., 4QQS 53.
■^William Russell to William Preston, July 17, 1776, Draper
Mss., 4 Q Q , 54.
39

William Russell to William Preston, July 20, 1776, Draper
Mss., 4QQ, 55.
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wooden stockade for further protection.

Again supply problems

were evident, Russell complaining that over two hundred pounds of
powder stored at Fort Chiswell were useless.

He said that he

had written to Colonel Fleming, requesting fifty additional men
and a sufficient quantity of powder to last until fresh supplies
could be obtained.
On the twenty-third Russell wrote two letters to Preston,
the first of these again discussing problems with raising sufficient
numbers of men to defend the frontier,

40

and the second along much

the same lines, detailing measures taken to fortify and protect
the lead mines particularly.

He also added that he had received

news of a great victory by the frontiersmen over the Cherokees
''near the big island.

Although Russell goes no further than

this, an account of the battle did appear in the Virginia Gazette
in August, in the form of a letter written by the principal officers
involved.

Their account of the actions was as follows:
On the 19th [July] our scouts returned and informed
us that they had discovered where a great number of
Indians were making into the settlement, upon which
alarm, the few men that were stationed at Eaton completed
a breastwork, sufficiently strong, with the assistance
of what men were there, to have repelled a considerable
number, sent expresses to the different stations, and
collected all the forces in one body, and the morning
after about 170 turned out in search of the enemy. We
inarched in two divisions, with flankers on each side and
scouts before.
Our scouts discovered upwards of twenty
meeting us and fired on them. They returned the fire,
but our men rushed on them with such violence that they
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William Russell to William Preston, July 2.3, 1776, Draper
Mss., 4QQ, 58.
"^William Russell to William Preston, July 23, 1776, Draper
Mss., 4QQ, 57. Although the sources are unclear at times, "big
island” and "Long Island" appear to be used interchangeably.
The
latter term is used in the map on page 68.

were obliged fco make a very precipitate retreat. We
took ten bundles, and a good deal of plunder, and great
reason to think some of them were wounded.
This small
skirmish happened on ground very disadvantageous for
our men to pursue, though it was with great difficulty
our officers could restrain their men. A council was
held, and it was thought adviseable to return, as we
imagined there was a large party not far off. We
accordingly returned, and had not marched more than a
mile when a number not inferior to ours attacked us
in the rear. Our men sustained the attack with great
bravery and intrepidity and immediately formed a line.
The Indians endeavored to surround u s , but were prevented
by the uncommon fortitude and vigilance of Captain James
Shelby, who took possession of an eminence that prevented
their design.
Our line of battle extended about a quarter
of a mile. We killed 13 on the spot, whom we found,
and have the greatest reason to believe that we could
have found many more, had we had time to search for
them. There were streams of blood every way, and it
was generally thought there was never so much execution
done in so short a time on the frontiers.
Never did
troops fight with greater calmness than ours did.
The
Indians attacked us with the greatest fury imaginable,
and made the most vigorous efforts to surround us. Our
Spies really deserved the greatest applause. We took
a great deal of plunder and many guns, and had only
four men slightly wounded.
The rest of the troops are
in high spirits and eager for another engagement. We
have the greatest reason to believe they are pouring
in great numbers on us, and beg the assistance of our
friends«
[Signed]

James Thompson
Jamas Shelby
William Buchanan
John Campbell
William Cocke
Thomas M a d i s o n f

The Virginia Gazette contained further references to skirmishes
on the frontier xvhich do not appear in William Preston*s papers,
On August 9 Purdie printed excerpts from letters written by "officer
of rank in Fincastle."

One gave details of an Indian attack on

the fort at Watauga, which lasted all day on July 21, in which it

.9

“Purdie*s Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), August 2, 1776.

41
was reported several Indians had been wounded as evidenced by
the quantities of blood on the field*

The Indians withdrew but

shortly thereafter returned and laid siege to the fort.

A

messenger escaped from the fort after six days and got news of
the siege to the Holston River settlements, which responded by
immediately dispatching a relief force, expected to arrive, at
43
the fort on the 29th.
These successes were met by considerable elation on the
part of the Virginians, but none of the basic plans for dealing
with the frontier crisis seem to have been altered in light of
them..

Russell wrote Preston four days after the victory at the

big island, mentioning a letter he had just received from Watauga
detailing the great distress of those settlers.

He may here be

referring to the siege of the fort, though there is no way to
tell if this was indeed the case*

44

He also mentioned that an

encampment of forty Cherokee was to be attacked the following day
at their encampment below Kennedy Mill by one hundred rangers®

45

Besides the usual call for reinforcements, Russell indicated what
was becoming an increasing problem for the frontiersmen, sufficient
supplies of food.

He requested that cattle be sent immediately,

as the Indians had driven off large numbers of both cattle and

''Purdie’s Va. Gazette (Williamsburg), Aug, 9, 1776.
44

William Russell to William Preston, July 24, 1776, Draper
Mss,, 4QQ, 59.
45

Although in subsequent letters Russell did not mention the
outcome of this attack, it was apparently quite successful.
See
Purdie fs Va. Gazette (Williamsburg), A u g . 9, 1776 for a brief
account of the action.
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horses, unguarded because their owners were in the forts for pro
tection .
Further information which Russell sent Preston in July was
much along the same lines as the above letters, discussing problems
of raising sufficient militia, always coupled with a request for
reinforcements, and giving indications of the Indian advance and
the depredations which accompanied it.

Thus far the frontiersmen

had been required almost wholly to provide for their own defense,
and, it seems from the accounts available, they did an admirable
job of it.

It is equally obvious that by the end of July they

had done all within their means to withstand the Indians and massive
aid from the Virginians was now required.

While they had defeated

the Indians in several instances they had been unable to drive
them out of the region.

Perhaps the most dangerous new development

was the growing scarcity of food.

If the Indians could not defeat

the frontiersmen by force of arms, it was possible they could
starve, them into submission if aid were not immediately forthcoming,
It was just at this time, late in July, that the first indica
tions that the frontiersmen's many requests for aid in the form
of troops as well as supplies would be m e t ,

Preston wrote a letter

to someone in Williamsburg on July 30, giving further details of
the Indians * progress along the Holston River,

The most important

information was his acknowledgment of a letter he had received on
the 22d of July (apparently this was not preserved) telling him
for the first time that the Council had initiated plans for sending
an expedition against the Indians,

William Preston to
4QQ, 61.
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The letter he received

» July 301 1776, Draper Mss,,

apparently also contained certain instructions as to actions he
was to take to prepare for the expedition.

He mentioned that he

would immediately engage a number of men to supply the army with
provisions, adding that he could not undertake to 'do this himself,
but that he would see to it that no time was lost in making prepa
rations,

Continuing on the theme of supplies, he added that they

would have to be carried in casks on wagons, since it would be
impossible to secure enough bags for pack horses to be employed.
Neither was there enough cloth on the frontier to make tents for
the militia.

Significantly, he included the suggestion that money

be made available for immediate payment in cash, as the frontiers
men had suffered from a lack of payments in 1774 during Dunmore ?s
expedition against the Shawnee.
Preston further indicated that additional troops were in fact
necessairy because between six and eight hundred Cherokee were
opposing the limited forces then on the frontier.

He added, almost

prophetically, that the Indians would not remain tied to their
towns in static defensive positions, because of the river by which
they would escape easily with all their families.

He ended by

saying that he had just written to a Colonel Calloway urging him
to prepare as much lead for the expedition as possible.
Although Preston received further important communications
during the month of August, the focus of action moved from the
frontier to Williamsburg and the eastern region of the state,
where plans for the expedition were rapidly carried into execution*
On August first the Council ordered the keeper of the public
magazine at New Castle to deliver one ton of gunpowder to Colonel

44
Charles Lewis for use by the expedition.

On the same day the

Council ordered the issuance of a commission appointing Colonel
William Christian colonel of the first battalion and commanderin-chief of the expeditionary forces.

Included were instructions

to Colonel Christian regarding the desired goals for which the
expedition had been organized.

As was typical with this sort of

order, a great deal of leeway was given in order that Christian
could shape his actions to conform with the dictates of a fluid
situation.

Only two details in the general instructions seem

to have been mandatory.

The first was that Christian was to

correspond with the commander of the North Carolina troops which
were to undertake an attack against the lower Cherokee towns at
about the same time as the Virginia expedition was to attack
the Overhill Cherokee.

47

The obvious intention was to coordinate

the troop movements in the two attacks as nearly as possible in
order that nearly simultaneous blows would fall on the Cherokee
Nation.

The second order was a directive that Christian write

the Governor and Council from time to time during the course of
the expedition, including all relevant details and requesting
explanations of certain orders if he needed them.

The final

order issued by the Council this day was to Colonel Charles Lewis,
commander of the Second Battalion.

He was directed to have his

captains march their companies to their respective counties, recruit
new troops and discharge those unfit for service in the present
campaign, and proceed to the Big Island on the Holston River, the

47

Ho R. Mcllwaine, ed., Official Letters of the Governors of
I, Letters of Patrick "Henry (Richmond, 1926), 21-22.
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site of the general rendezvous .^
The need to supply adequately Christian's proposed expedition
with arms, ammunitions and food occupied a good deal of time and
energy both in Williamsburg and on the frontier during August.
Preston began to arrange for the purchase of food by the end of
the third week in July, and on August first the Council ordered
one ton of gunpowder for the expedition.

On August 2 Preston

reported on progress made to the President of the Councils, John
Page.

49

In accordance with an order from Council, Preston appointed

Captains Shelby and Madison to supply the army with provisions,
informing them immediately by express.

So that no time would

be lost he also advertised for beef and flour, promising ’'ready
money" for all that his men could obtai.n.

Trie frontiersmen were

In short supply of flints for rifles at this time, and Preston
requested that a sufficient supply be made available from Williamsburg.
He also included in this letter the same information about lead
supplies and the use of wagons for transporting the supplies®
On August 6 the Council requisitioned further supplies for
the expedition.

A letter was dispatched to Colonel Thomas Fleming,

commander of the Ninth Battalion, ordering him to send 10,000 weight
of sulphur to Williamsburg, part of which was to be used in making
gunpowder for the expedition,

50

An additional 1,000 weight of

powder and 2,000 flints were also ordered from the keeper of the

^bMeIlwaine, e d ., Ibid.
49
'William Preston to John Page, Fincastle, August 2, 1776,
Draper Mss., 4QQ, 65.
50

Mellwaine, ed., Official Letters, 25.

magazine to be sent to Colonel Christian Vs force.

Preston was

informed of the Council’s actions in a letter he received on
August 7.

53
* The final reference to the gathering of supplies for

the expedition that I have found was contained in a letter from
52
James Buchanan to Colonel Preston in the second week of August.'
Buchanan apparently was one of the purchasing agents Preston had
sent out to accumulate supplies.

It seems that Preston had made

an excellent choice in Buchanan.

He reported that he could buy

at least 100,000 pounds of flour at nine shillings per hundred
weight.

More flour could be had if need be, but the dryness of

the summer had caused a slowing in mill operations and extra time
would be needed.

He had likewise made arrangements for the purchas-

of one hundred head of cattle in the area between the North and
South James Rivers, and said he awaited the arrival of good drovers
before purchasing more or trying to move those already obtained.
A quantity of wagons, complete with casks, had been obtained from
a Mr. Barnard and would be available for transportation services
almos t immediately.
Perhaps one reason no further mention was made of problems
with the purchase of provisions is that nothing more was needed
if Buchanan was indeed successful in accumulating the amount he
spoke of.

The daily bread allowance for the Continental Army in

51
Andrew Lewis to William Preston, Williamsburg, August 7,
1776, Draper Mss., 4QQ, 67«
52

James Buchanan, to William Preston, August 11, 1776, Draper
Mss., 400, 37.

1775 was one pound per man.
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If this ration is used as a guide

lines, Buchanan had purchased enough flour to feed the entire
expedition for something over fifty days, there being about 2,000
men total involved.

Christian, in his reports while in the field,

never mentioned a supply problem and. in fact, had a sufficient
surplus to give several wagonloads of flour to the hard-pressed

54

Wataugans.

On the question of achieving a close coordination between
the attacks of the North Carolina and Virginia expeditions, not
a great deal was written and I assume, for lack of evidence, that
it was too difficult an undertaking to send messengers continually
between the two camps.

John Page, President of the Council,

corresponded twice with the North Carolina Council of Safety,
the first giving details of the situation on the frontier.

The

second, somewhat more informative, included thanks for North
Carolina’s prompt compliance with Virginia’s request for troops,
three hundred of which were sent.

Page added in this case that

the combined force would amount to 1750 men, the lowest estimate
for the size of the expedition I have seen.
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Thus, by late August 1776, in the space of about one month,
the Virginia government , working in close coordination with such
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William Christian to Patrick Henry, 6 mile camp, October 6,
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frontiersmen as Thomas Preston and Thomas Madison, the commissary
for the expedition, as well as William Christian, had succeeded
in planning for and provisioning a rather massive expedition
against the Overhill Cherokee towns.
The next chapter will include an account of the final prepa
rations for the beginning of the expedition and a description of
the expedition itself.

It was just at this crucial point in the

preparations for the expedition that, seemingly, no one had time
to write letters.

Very few details of the final days in Virginia

before the rendezvous at Big Island are available.

However, certain

reasonable, assumptions as to the actual events can and will be
made.

Chapter 4
Colonel William Christian's Cherokee Expedition

At the same time that supplies were being requisitioned,
collecteds and shipped in August and early Septembers the commanders of the Cherokee expedition were preparing their men for
the coming campaign.

Charles Lewis, colonel of the Second

Battalion of Virginia militia, received a directive from the
Council on August first to order the captains of each company in
his command to march their men to the counties in which they had
been raised.

Apparently a significant proportion of the. men were

from counties in western Virginia.

General Andrew Lewis seemed

to indicate this when he said in a letter, "I recommended dis
charging the Second Battalion at this place because they were
from the county from which our frontiers could have assistance
and had brought with them most of the firearms that were service2
able."

If indeed the Second Battalion was drawn largely from

western counties, two additional purposes were served by choosing
it. for the campaign.

First, when the companies had reached full

strength, they would be within easy marching distance of the
rendezvous site on the Big Island.

Second, frontiersmen serving

in the militia often became dispirited and unreliable when they

■^General Andrew Lewis to William Preston, Williamsburg,
August 7, 1776, Draper Mss., 4QQ, 67.
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50
felt their aim families and. property were endangered by hostile
Indians.

Sending *them with their companies back to the frontier

would provide the psychological advantage of having the men serve
close to home.
The ideal structure of a militia company, in terns of person
nel and equipment, in Virginia was described in the report of a
special committee on military defence to the Richmond Convention
of 1775.

The section on the infantry stated, "each company of

infantry is to consist of sixty-eight rank-and file, to be commanded
by one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, four sergeants, four
corporals, have a drummer and be furnished with a drum and colors«,
. . . every man be provided with a good rifle, or with a common
flintlock, bayonet, and car touch box, and. also with a tomahawk,
one pound of gunpowder, and four pounds of ball at least, fitted
to the bore of his?, gun; that he be clothed in a hunting shirt,
by way of uniform;

2
. . .

It does not seem that comprehensive lists were compiled
during this period indicating the names or even number of men
that were discharged from each company and how successful the.
captains were in recruiting replacements.

Testimony from a

number of sources leads one to believe that they were less success
ful than, had been anticipated.

Colonel James Robertson, in a

mid-September letter to William Preston, said that the lack of
able men in Botetourt County had forced him to create a new
company by taking five or six men from each of several companies

2
"As quoted in Dixon and Hunter, Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg),
Apr. 1, 1775, 2„

already in the field,

3

A more informative account of problems in

recruiting was given by Charles Lewis after the campaign had begun.
"I am sorry to tell your Excellency that from sickness and death
X have not been able to bring but a little more than 300 men of
tici

the 2

Battalion on this important expedition.

The men being

so very sickly while they were in the service below gave the people
of the counties that composed the Battalion such a distaste to
the minute service, that very few new recruits could be raised
by the. officers:

But the deficiency has been amply made up by

the activity and good conduct of Colo. Christian in raising the
men in the back counties."^

Colonel William Christian also referred

to this problem in a letter written to Governor Patrick Henry
while the campaign was in progress.

"Lieut. Colo. Russell who

*

was much disappointed, especially in the County of Fincastle
about getting the three hundred men ordered by the Convention,
took into service a great part of the men in the Forts [Watauga
and HoIston3; that step, and that alone, prevented the people
5
from starving or quitting the country altogether»"'
The strategic goals of the campaign were delineated in the
Council’s initial instructions to Colonel Christian.

The expedition

had been organized "for the purpose of severely chastising that

3
James Robertson to William Preston, Sept. 16, 1776, Draper
Mss., 4QQ, 72.
^Charles Lewis to Patrick Henry, Oct. 6, 1776, Executive
Papers of Patrick Henry, Virginia State Archives, Richmond.
^William Chris tian
trick Henry, Oct. 16, 1776, Executive
Papers of Patrick Henr^T Virginia State Archives, Richmond,
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Cruel and Perfidious [Cherokee] Nation which you are to do in the
manner most likely to put a stop to future Insults and Ravages and
that may redound most: to the honour of the American A r m s ."

If he

were successful in this undertaking he "must take care to demand
and receive a sufficient number of their Chiefs and Warriors as
Hostages for the Performance of the Conditions you may require of
them*

You must insist on their delivering up all Prisoners, who

may chuse to leave them and on their giving up to justice all
persons amongst them who have been concerned in bringing on the
present war particularly Stewart, Cameron, and Gist, and all others
who have committed Murders or Robberies on our Frontiers.
As to the actual tactics of the campaign, Christian was
allowed almost complete freedom to make his own plans.

He described

them in. some detail to North Carolina General Rutherford, in the
only extant letter I discovered which passed between the two prior
to the actual campaign.

7

In this letter, written in mid-August,

Christian said.
The Number of effective men allotted to be under
ray command are 1450 besides those from your province,
They are now gathering with all possible dispatch and
will begin to march in less than two weeks from the
different counties in which they are to be raised. I
have appointed the General Rendezvous to be held at the
Big Island on Holston fiver on the 20th day of Sep. The
Island is in the Enemy's Country and within 130 miles
of the principal Overhill Towns *
I shall endeavour to inarch in a day or two after
the Rendezvous and loose no time afterwards, but hurry
on as quick as possible.
I hope to take with me Fifty
days provisions.
The Flour I will haul in Waggons and

6
Mcllwaine, Official Letters - Governors of V irgin i a , 21-22.
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Several others were written because Christian mentions them
in this letter. However, I have been unable to find them.

will open a waggon road as I go. When I wrote on the
15th Instant to South Carolina I iiaagined It would be
betwixt the 10th and the 15th day of October before I
could be at the Towns® But; now I concluded I may be
there about the 5th, I have no doubt of marching ten
miles each day.
I know of nothing that can delay me
except repeated skirmishes or Broad river its being
high.
I am now near the center of the County [Botetourt]
which will furnish the provisions and men for the
Expedition, therefore I shall wait here, if nothing new
occurs, about ten days longer and then begin to move
towards the place of Rendezvous, which is 190 miles
from here, jn order to be there eight or ten days
beforehand.
Colonel Christian, commander of the impending expedition, was
well qualified for such an undertaking by virtue of his long service
on the frontier in both military and civil capacities.

He was born

in 1743 to Israel and Elizabeth Stark Christian, a couple from
the Isle of Man who had emigrated first to Ireland and then to
Augusta County in 1740.

9

Israel Christian became the proprietor

of a general store in Staunton, and evidently was quite successful
as a businessman and land speculator since he was able to give his
son-in™law, William Fleming, a large estate in Botetourt Count}’'
a quarter of a century later.

Little Is known of William Christian®

early life and education, but he apparently began a military career
at an early age, since in 1763 he was listed as a captain in Colonel
William Byrd's regiment and had seen service on the frontier.

10

In 1767 he entered the law office of Patrick Henry as a student

William Christian to Brigadier General Rutherford, Botetourt
County, Aug. 18, 1776, Executive Papers of Patrick Henry, V a ., State
Archives, Richmond,

9See Thomas Benton McCormick in DAB s.v. ''Christian, William..

managing to find sufficient free time to woo and win the hand of

11

Anne Henry, Patrick's favorite s i s t e r C h r i s t i a n returned to the
frontier shortly thereafter, residing first

in

Botetourt and then

Fincasfle County.

in

the

He represented Fincastle

Virginia House of

Burgesses in the 1773, 17745 and 1775 sessions, and both counties
in the Senate in 1776 and again from 1780-1783.

12

He also served as

a member of the Fincastle Committee of Safety in 1775 and was a
delegate to the convention which met in Richmond on March 20 and July
17, 1775 to discuss and initiate proceedings for allying Virginia
13
to the patriot cause and organizing its defensive system 1
He had remained an active participant in military ventures
throughout the period, commanding a regiment of Fincastle militia
during Bunmore's War,

On February 13, 1776

he

was

commissioned a

lieutenant colonel of the First Virginia Regiment, Continental Line,
and was promoted to the rank of colonel on March 18,

14

In July

he resigned this post to accept a commission as a colonel of the
Virginia militia and appointment as commander of the expedition
against the Cherokee by the Virginia Council of Defense (August 1,
-

15

1776;,’

Christian represented Virginia: as a commissioner at the

peace talks, which met on the Long Island

onthe

Holston, July 20,

1777, with the Cherokee which resulted from his campaign.

11Ibid,
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34
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Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid.

In August

55
1785 he moved to Kentucky with his family, settling near Louisville
on a portion of the 9000 acre land grant he had received from
Virginia as compensation for his military service»

On April 9,

1786 he was killed there by a party of Wabash Indians*

16

Some unforeseen delays obviously did occur in the prepara
tions and execution of the expedition, as Christian and his men
did not reach the Indian towns until about one week after the
date he originally anticipated.

Significant detachments intended

for the expeditionary force had not even marched for the rendez
vous point by September 20th, the date Christian had set for
everyone to have arrived.

The situation was described in a letter

William Russell wrote to Colonel Preston on September 21.

f,I

arrived here [Fort Chiswell, Fincastle County] yesterday evening
with orders from Col. Christian to hurry down the remainder of
the troops together with such waggons as have come this far.
I left the Island the 18th with only 300 officers and men.

. . .
I met

Colonel Williams [commander of the North Carolina detachment]
and his battalion at 15 mile creek, the Botetourt companies and
our waggons of stores about a mile and a half ahead of the
. 17
Carolinians and Colo. Lewis is now here and will march tomorrow.'1
It is evident that Christian sent Russell from the rendezvous
point back into Virginia to discover what the delay w a s , since,
only two days before the appointed time for the rendezvous, less
than one-sixth of the force had arrived.

Christian himself did

16
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William Russell to William Preston, Sept. 21, 1776, Draper
Mss., 4QQ, 73.

not mention the cause of the delay in any of his subsequent
reports to Governor Henry.
As to the actual events of the campaign once it was under
way, the only reliable sources are Christian’s three reports to
Patrick Henry, and two additional letters written by members of
the expedition, neither of which does more than confirm what
Christian had said.

18

The first c£ Christian’s reports was written a short time
after the campaign had gotten under w a y .

He had ordered a fort,

named Fort Patrick Henry, constructed on the Great Island in
which he left a portion of the supplies and one hundred men on
garrison duty.

Few Indians had been encountered in the area

immediately around the island, and the only action which he had
to report was an occasional attempt by Indians to ambush a single
soldier.

He included a brief account of one such occurrence.

"The Enemy generally fire from behind logs and bushes, and seldom
at a greater distance than eight or ten steps; last Tuesday three
of them fired upon two men and broke one of their arms but they
got away.

Nothing has been done since.

19

The coordination between Christian’s men and the North

38
J. G. Ramsey provided a somewhat more detailed account of
the course taken by the expedition in his Annals of Tennessee
(Charleston, 1853).
He. did not indicate the sources for the
additional details he included, however, and it is possible he
reconstructed the route on the basis of what he thought was feasibl
I hesitate to use his work as a reference since, in other Instances
he made glaring errors concerning the expedition.
For example, he
stated that several detachments for the expedition had reached the
rendezvous point by August (p. 165)!
19

William Christian to Patrick Henry, Oct. 6, 1776, Executive
Papers of Patrick Henry, Va. State Archives, Richmond.

Carolinian forces under Brigadier Rutherford which had been hoped
for did not materialize.

Christian mentioned in the letter that

he had not heard from Rutherford since a letter he received on
August 27.

The number of troops effectively under his command

which he could rely on in the event of a major battle was approx
imately 2,000.

The patriot government had mobilized 1,450 militia

for the expedition, and a contingent of 300 troops from North
Carolina had been sent to participate directly under Christian’s
command.

20

An additional number of men, the number never having

been specified by Christian, were recruited from among the fron
tiersmen in the forts and blockhouses on the Watauga and Holston

21

rivers.

Hie immediate plans for the expedition reveal Christian as
a commander supremely confident in his own ability and that of
his man to meet any eventuality.

"I shall march in less than an

Hour and take with me 30 days flour and seventy days Beef,

I

hope to cross the [French] Broad river the 15th Instant where it
is most likely I will be attacked or meet with proposals of peace.
The men who have fled from the Towns say that the Indians will
surely fight desperately; which they promised Stewart the King’s
Superintendent to do; and Cameron his deputy who remains amongst
them is dally encouraging them to defend their country against
a parcel of Rebels.

I Heartily wish that they may attack me

20
Mcllwaine, e d,, ^Official Letters, 27.
^^William Christian to Patrick Henry, Oct. 6, 1776, Executive
Papers of Patrick Henry, Va. State Archives, Richmond.
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firsts and it is the wish of the Army.11'

He added further,

"Cameron, being an artful man, may invent measures to delay our
March if the Indians will execute them with dexterity, but I
still have no doubt of returning to the Island in five weeks
from this time, six at the furthest.”

23

The remainder of this report was a description of the extreme
hardships suffered by and deplorable condition of the frontiers”
men in the Watauga and Holston area.

He visited several of the

nearby forts, where about three thousand people had sought shelter,
and ". . . found many in want of provisions, great numbers sick,
and heard of many that had died, occasioned 1 supposed by their
close confinement and being too much crowded together."

He

ordered several wagonloads of flour to be distributed among these,
people, but took extreme pains so as not to appear to be dis
posing supplies without authorization.

Christian assured Henry

that he "gave orders to the Commissary to keep an account thereof,
that the men may be called upon to pay for it, or such other steps
taken therein as your Excellency and the Honorable Council shall
please to direct.

In all probability there will be more flour

than X shall want for the expedition.

It might prevent great

distress if [you] would allow some of it to be sold to such of
75

the Inhabitants as have lost their crops by the War." “

77
"Christian to Henry, Oct. 6, 1776, Ibid.
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Christian to Henry, Oct. 6, 1776, Ibid.
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Christian to Henry, Oct. 6, 1776, Ibid.

75
'Christian to Henry, Oct. 6, 1776, Ibid.

Christian's next report, written Oct. 14-15 on the banks of
the French Broad river, indicated that the army had made good
time on their march, encountering no delays worthy of mention.
He did report that on the twelfth a white man bearing a truce flag
had entered the militia camp.

The man had been sent by the

Cherokee Chief, the Raven, requesting a parley to determine if
peace could be arranged on agreeable terms.

Christian's reply

was indicative again of the high confidence he had in his own
ability to conduct
answer was:

a

successful campaign.

He reported that his

"How can he [the Raven] send to me for peace before

he has delivered up Cameron that enemy to white and red people.
How can the Nation think of Asking peace of me when they retain
our prisoners; How can they ask a peace when they have the assur
ance to assemble their men to Fight me, if they should dislike
my terns *

That I should cross the river and proceed to the Town,

that mercy and Bravery v?as the Characteristiek of the States of
America; and that I should distinguish between those towns who
26
had behaved well towards us, and others who had not done so." '
On the thirteenth Christian executed what in retrospect was
the most hazardous movement of the entire campaign.

He had

reached the near bank of the French Broad in late afternoon and
expected his crossing to be opposed by a large force of Cherokee.
He sent out scouts to discover alternate fordings, one of which
was discovered several miles below the camp.

Having found this,

he said, "Ten o'clock at night I set off with between ten and

William Christian to Patrick Henry, Oct. 14-15, 1776,
Executive Papers of Patrick Henry, Va. State Archives, Richmond.

eleven hundred men, 200 of them mounted on horses and by One
O'clock in the morning got over with much danger and difficulty,
the river being so Deep and rapid that none of the men could
waid, the night was so very dark I was obliged frequently to make
lights, the river about half a mile counting the several windings
we were obliged to m a k e ."

27

Having successfully completed this

movement, Christian marched his men to the area where the Indians
were supposedly waiting in ambush, surrounded the site, and found
nothing.
He received a report from some of his advance, spies on the
fourteenth that he could expect the Indians to resist his advance
all the wav to their towns and thereafter follow a "scorchedearth" policy to slow his movements.

He accepted this report as

accurate, saying that he believed the first peace proposal he
received was the attitude of only the Raven Warrior of Chote and
that it had been disapproved of by most of the rest.

He did not

rule out the possibility of further offers of peace, as he felt
the Indians were disconcerted at the rapid progress of his force.
Christian received just such an offer the next day, which
he reported in a second letter and enclosed it with the first.
Captain Nathaniel Gist had entered camp the previous night under
a flag of truce to intercede for the Raven warrior of Chote.
Gist claimed that Christian’s reply to the first peace proposal
had caused the Raven’s people and many others to retreat rapidly
westward.

No firm conclusion could be drawn from this inforraatioi
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however, because Cameron apparently was still trying to rally
the Cherokee in defense of their land.

Gist reported Cameron

had advised “the Indians to burn their Towns and Corn; because
they must then depend on him for ammunition to get meat and by
28
that means to continue the War *11

Gist's statements apparently

had the desired effect on Christian because he concluded the
letter by saying, "I believe I shall push first for the Island
Town and those who bred the war, and have thought^of Sparing
Chote.“

29

Naturally there were other reasons why Colonel Christian

would follow a policy of leniency towards those Cherokee towns
which had remained peaceful.

An indiscriminate attack on all the

towns would serve only to eliminate those groups which, if not
friendly, had at least maintained their neutrality.

There was

little hope that the expeditionary force could overwhelmingly
crush the Cherokee in battle because, as Preston had pointed out
months before, if they did not wish to fight they could easily
escape by way of the river.

Christian undoubtedly knew this and

shaped his policy accordingly.
Colonel Christian’s final report while on the campaign was
written at the Indian town which he had made his headquarters on
October twenty-third.

His passage of the Tennessee and subsequent

march through several of the Indian towns was completely unopposed.
The condition in which he found the towns is indicative of the
extreme haste.in which the people fled.

28
29

"Some of them [Cherokees]

Christian to Henry, Oct. 14-15, 1776, Ibid.

William Christian to Patrick Henry, Oct. 23, 1776, the
Executive Papers of Patrick Henry, Virginia State Archives, Richmond.

had shut their doors and some had not, they had carried off their
d e a t h s and best of their household goods, but took little pro
visions,

The greatest part of them I judge went off in canoes

down the Tennessee.
Fowls a"

30

They left Horses, Cattle, Dogs, Hogs, and

The effect of the reply Christian had given to the

first peace envoy had been dramatic, and the man himself told
Christian, " & . . every party he delivered my answer to turned
about and ran home as quick as possible, that he rode fast from
Broad river to the towns and that some of them kept up with him
on foot.

That the next day after all the people in the Towns

picked up and fled, . . . "

down the Tennessee and Highwassey

31
Rivers.'
Christian sent out scouts to inform the Indians that he
would now talk over peace terms with them since they had refused
to fight.

He continued by saying that he expected several of

the important Cherokee chiefs to enter camp the next day to begin
talks.

Christian added, with a mixture of compassion and common

sense, ffI suppose that in three

days after [thearrival of the

chiefs] I can open a treaty, or begin to destroy the Town and
pursue the Indians towards the Creeks.

I know Sir that I could

kill and take Hundreds of them and starve hundreds by destroying
their corn, but it would be mostly the women and Children, as
the men could retreat faster than I can follow.

And I am convinced

that the V i r g . State would be better pleased to hear that I shewed

30

Christian to Henry, Oct.

^ Christian to Henry, Oct.

23, 1776, Ib i d .
23, 1776, Ibid.
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pity to the distressed and spared the suppliants rather than I
should commit one act of Barbarity in destroying a whole nation of
Enemies."

32

He finished this part of his account by saying that

the principal causes of the war he now believed to be Cameron and
one of the Cherokee chiefs, Dragging Canoe.

Speaking of the latter

Christian said, "This Chief was the principal agent in hastening
the War.

I came through other Towns without touching anything in

them and am now destroying his.

I intend to destroy some others

that was under his influence, whether I make peace or not, particularly a tox<m in which a man was burnt, that was taken at Watauga."

33

After discussing some rumors he had heard regarding the possibility
of a Shawnee attack on the frontier and accounting for some supplies
of lead and powder which he had sent the frontier settlements,
Christian concluded, "I expect to be in Botetourt by the 20th of
November whether I treat or not. .

34

With the completion of this letter, the Christian expedition
was at its end.

He negotiated a temporary settlement with several

Cherokee chieftains, the Raven Warrior among them, and then returned
to Fort Patrick Henry late in November.

Here the greatest portion of

the expeditionary force was disbanded and the men returned to their
homes.

The final treaty with the Cherokee was negotiated in July of

1777, with William Christian serving as one of the Virginia commissloners, along with Colonel William Preston and Major Evan Shelby.
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“Christian to

Henry, Oct. 23,

1776, lb i d .

-’Christian to

Henry, Oct. 23,

1776, Ibid.

^Christian to

Henry, Oct. 24,

17764Ibid.
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Patrick Henry to William Christian, Hanover, Jan. 22, 1777,
.Draper Mss., 4Q0, 77.
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Conclusion

What are the conclusions which one might make, reasonably after
completing this study of the Virginia - North Carolina frontier in
1776 and of Colonel William Christian's expedition against the
Overhill Cherokee?

Some have been discussed at some length in the

body of the essay, while others have received only passing mention.
It is entirely possible, of course, that still others lie as yet
unrecognized amidst the mass of source material.
Since the period studied lies entirely within the American
Revolutionary War, the question which naturally is raised is how
the outcome of the Christian expedition affected the relative
positions of the two combatant powers, at least in relation to the
southern frontier.

First, and most apparent, the study demonstrated

that the British Indian agents, left largely to their own devices,
were unable to achieve effective control over their Indian allies
in the South.

The one goal which John Stuart explicitly stated as

an immediate objective, that of restraining the Indians from making
indiscriminate border attacks, was never realized.

His concern for

the welfare of frontier Loyalists, which led him to attempt to con
trol the Indians initially, points to another goal, never explicit,
but certainly implicit both in the logic of the frontier situation
and In certain of the actions of the British agents.
This goal was the attempt to create what I have called a
Loyalist state or refuge on the Southern frontier in Indian territory.
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Certainly if this could have been accomplished the British cause
would have benefitted greatly by it.

The British could have con

served the Loyalist strength and sentiment that existed on the
frontier by organizing British sympathizers into some sort of rudi
mentary colony, protected from patriot harassment and coercion by
the Indian allies.

By concentrating these groups in one area, the

British could also facilitate the. movement and dispersal of vitally
needed supplies.

Once such a base had been created it could have

served both offensive and defensive purposes.

If the Indians and

Loyalists could achieve a significant degree of coordination of
activities, offensive raids against patriot outposts were a possible,
course of action.

If the refuge were intended to serve a primarily

defensive purpose, as seems more likely, it would conserve Loyalist
strength against the time when British strategic planners again
looked to the South for a theater of military operations.
The massive reaction to the Cherokee Indian raids by the
Virginia and North Carolina revolutionary governments ended the
viability of the Loyalist refuge concept as a possible British
objective.

It is probable that the patriots themselves only dimly

perceived this particular result of their operations.

At the same

time, however, they were well aware that the British could not be
allowed uncontested influence among the Indian tribes on their
frontiers.

They reacted militarily in exactly the manner one would

expect from a people long accustomed to frontier hostilities.

Yet

the actions of the leader of the expedition, William Christian,
displayed an acute awareness of the larger issues at: stake.

He

knew that it would be impossible to physically destroy the fighting

capability of the Cherokee and acted accordingly.

His policy of

leniency towards neutral or friendly Cherokee towns was calculated
to win the allegiance of as many Indians as possible away from the
British.

This particular policy was continued in 1777 at the peace

treaty concluded with the Cherokee.^
The expedition not only insured the loyalty of most frontiers
mens but also largely secured the frontier against Indian depreclation for a number of years.

2

The frontiersmen showed themselves

to be resourceful, energetic people, able to rise rapidly and
cooperate with each other well in providing for their common defense.
It is equally apparent, however, that they simply did not have the
resources, human or material, to withstand any protracted series
of attacks.

They relied heavily on aid from the Virginia govern

ment when faced by a major crisis, and the Virginia government
reacted with reasonable dispatch in responding to the frontiersmen’s
pleas for assistance.
The position occupied by such men as William Preston and the
others in eastern Fincastle County was central, both literally
and figuratively.

The energy with which he responded to the demands

of the situation was boundless.

Preston served as the communications

hub of the period, transmitting messages to and from the seat of

^See Patrick Henry’s instructions to the Virginia commissioners«
The patriots adopted British policies such as providing their allies
with supplies.
See Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutionary Frontier 1763-1783 (New
York, 1967), 91. One group of Cherokee, under Dragging Canoe,
refused to sign the peace treaty and retreated deep into Tennessee.
There they were known as Chickamaugas and, besides harboring some
Loyalist refugees, carried out sporadic, largely ineffective, raids
against the Virginians.

revolutionary government in Williamsburg.

It was largely through

his efforts that the government was made aware of the dangers on
the frontier, and, after the expedition was planned, he arranged
for the purchase of many of the supplies so vital to its success.
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